Reagan's defense-bill veto strengthens U.S. arms-control posture

President Reagan's veto of the defense authorization bill is asound move toward effective arms control. His action shows he isdetermined not to let the United States return to the practice ofunilateral military concessions that proved so disastrous in the late1970s.

As altered by the Democratic leadership of Congress, the billwould cripple our Strategic Defense Initiative, hobbling thespace-based interceptor program for defense against enemy missiles.It would cut by one-quarter the funds needed to keep modernizing ourstrategic force and would prevent us from developing a mobileland-based missile. It would impose on us a unilateral moratoriumagainst testing missiles in lower flight trajectories. It wouldforce two Poseidon ballistic missile submarines into early retirementto bring aboiut unilateral U.S. compliance with the fatally flawedand unratified SALT II treaty.

In short, the bill is a throwback to the days before theReagan-Bush administration when politicians called the tune onarms-control policy and adhered to the notion that by givingsomething up unilaterally, we could cause the Soviets to reciprocate.

Having served as a senior arms-control negotiator for fourpresidents, I have experienced firsthand the futility of offering theSoviets unilateral concessions such as those written into this bill.The Soviets are realistic; they admire strength and abhor weakness.One simply does not reach agreements with them by setting the exampleor turning the other cheek.

We tried this latter approach in SALT II. The Democraticadministration slowed development of our MX missile, delayeddevelopment of the Trident II submarine-launched ballistic missileand canceled the B-1 bomber - all while we were in negotiations. Wewere instructed first to announce the unilateral decision to give upthe B-1 and then to ask the Soviets what they would give up inreturn.

It pains me still to remember the predictable Soviet response."You misunderstand the Soviets," Russian negotiator AlexanderShchukin told us. "That's not the way we negotiate. We are neitherpacifists nor philanthropists."

There was no reciprocity from Moscow, and we ended up with afatally flawed treaty that I could not, in good conscience, support.SALT II was not, as its apologists asserted, a stepping stone to abetter treaty. Had we ratified SALT II, we would have preventedourselves from reaching a good agreement.

President Reagan banished unilateral concessions from thelexicon of U.S. arms-control negotiators. He restored the B-1 andadded momentum to the MX and Trident II programs. Above all, heresisted making any unilateral disarmament concessions.

Remember the nuclear freeze movement? At its heyday in 1982 and1983, it was powerfully organized and suffered no dearth ofmass-media attention. Against such pressure, Vice President GeorgeBush traveled to Western Europe to urge our NATO allies to deploy thePershing II and ground-launched cruise missiles. Bush's mission wasa full success. The new missile deployments began, giving theSoviets the only sort of incentive that makes them negotiate inearnest. The result today is the INF Treaty, an agreement that willeliminate an entire class of ground-launched medium-range nuclearmissiles.

Had the president bowed to the pressures of the nuclearfreezers, we would not have achieved the historic INF Treaty.

Edward L. Rowny is special adviser to the president andsecretary of state for arms-control matters.